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I. INTRODUCTION
With the Supreme Court’s recognition of same-sex marriage in
Obergefell v. Hodges 1 in 2015, wedding vendors with religious objections
were placed in a predicament—violate their religious beliefs by
participating in same-sex weddings or face potential legal consequences

* J.D. Candidate at the University of Akron School of Law. I would like to thank Dean and C. Blake
McDowell, Jr. Professor of Law Christopher J. “C.J.” Peters for his generous guidance and support
throughout the writing process and Akron Law Review Associate Editor Ethan Peters for his editorial
assistance. I would also like to thank my wife and daughter for their love, patience, and support while
I worked on this project.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
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for refusing. Several wedding vendors including bakers, 2 florists, 3
photographers, 4 venue owners, 5 and others 6 were taken to court when they
refused to serve same-sex weddings on religious grounds. 7 The vendors
2. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018);
See also Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d., 139
S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (vacating and remanding to the Court of Appeals of Oregon to be considered in
light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n); Steven Mayer, The state wants
its cake in second major legal action against Tastries Bakery, BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN (Oct. 25,
2018),
https://www.bakersfield.com/news/the-state-wants-its-cake-in-second-major-legal-action/
article_019e7900-d8a1-11e8-a082-772b8114b114.html [https://perma.cc/R8ZN-5TVF] (providing
timeline of events for the legal action against a Bakersfield, California bakery).
3. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 193 Wash.2d 469 (Wash. 2019) (reaffirming previous
decision after remand from United States Supreme Court), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 11,
2019) (No. 19-333); Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Wash., 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (vacating and remanding
to the Supreme Court of Washington to be considered in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n).
4. See Telescope Media Grp. v. Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017) (granting
same-sex couple’s motion to dismiss), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero,
936 F.3d, 740, 762 (8th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court’s dismissal and allowing the
videographer’s case to proceed as a hybrid claim of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion);
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (holding that freedom of speech and
free exercise of religion did not allow photography business to discriminate against same-sex couple),
cert. denied, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 572 U.S. 1046 (2014); Amy Lynn Photography
Studio, LLC v. City of Madison, NO. 2017-CV-000555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 23, 2017) (granting
declaratory judgment that photography studio does not fall within the definition of a place of public
accommodation in the State of Wisconsin’s and the City of Madison’s anti-discrimination statutes).
5. See Knapp v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D. Idaho 2016) (dismissing,
in part, for lack of standing on wedding venue owner’s pre-enforcement complaint that antidiscrimination statute violates Free Exercise Clause); Matter of Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d
422 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (affirming State Division of Human Rights determination that venue
owners had violated the Human Rights Law); Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No.
CVCV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (dismissing gallery owners’ verified petition that
complaint by same-sex couple chilled their freedom of speech to express their religious beliefs against
same-sex marriage on their venue’s website); See also Wathen v. Walder Vacuflo, Inc., No. 2011SP-2488, No. 2011-SP-2489 (Ill. Human Rights Comm’n. Mar. 22, 2016) (requiring bed and
breakfast owner to facilitate same-sex marriage or civil union ceremonies when opposite-sex
ceremonies were allowed); Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008
(N.J. Div. of Civil Rights Oct. 22, 2012) (finding Methodist Association violated anti-discrimination
statute when it denied a same-sex couple use of its property for their civil union ceremony); Ros
Krasny, Lesbian brides win settlement from Vermont inn, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2012),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-lesbians-vermont/lesbian-brides-win-settlement-fromvermont-inn-idUSLNE87N00I20120824?feedType=RSS [https://perma.cc/ZK3W-HRBG] (Inn
owners settled with same-sex couple and Vermont Human Rights Commission and had to pay
$30,000 in damages).
6. See Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 895–96, 926 (Ariz. 2019)
(holding that the City of Phoenix’s ordinance as applied to the plaintiff’s creation of custom wedding
invitations violated article 2, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona’s Free Exercise of
Religion Act).
7. See Alexandra McPhee, Religious Liberty and the “Wedding Vendor” Cases, CTR. FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AT FAM. RES. COUNCIL (Nov. 2018), https://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF16L23.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39XD-4RYS].
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claimed protection by the Free Exercise Clause.8 The first of these cases
to make it to the United States Supreme Court was Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission where a Colorado baker refused
to make a custom wedding cake for a same-sex wedding. 9 The baker’s
free exercise claims had been denied by both the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals, and religious wedding
vendors across the country prayed the Supreme Court would
accommodate their religious beliefs. 10
On the other side of the issue were same-sex couples who had just
had their right to marry recognized across the country. Now they faced
the indignity of being refused service. Anti-discrimination laws like the
one in Colorado that protected from discrimination based on sexual
orientation were meant to protect this dignity, but many believed the laws
also infringed on the religious beliefs of others. 11 These two competing
interests—sexual orientation and religious beliefs—represented the core
identities of the parties. 12 This created a particularly heated public debate.
Both sides viewed Masterpiece Cakeshop as the opportunity to settle the
issue and protect their rights.
When the Supreme Court released its opinion in the case, neither side
got what they wanted. The Court issued a narrow opinion avoiding the
overall issue of whether the Free Exercise Clause allowed religious
accommodations to anti-discrimination laws by finding animus toward the
baker by members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. 13 With the
question still unanswered, the attention of both sides turned to other
potential cases that might solve the issue.
In this paper, I will argue that while the Court’s holding in
Masterpiece Cakeshop was narrow, it actually suggests a much broader
solution than the Court was able to provide—legislative accommodations
rooted in tolerance that protect the dignity of same-sex couples and
respect sincere religious beliefs. Part I will review the history of
8. U.S. CONST. amend I.
9. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720 (2018).
10. Id. at 1725–26.
11. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West 2017).
12. Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors?, 2017–2018
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 162 (arguing for heightened scrutiny for both sexual orientation
discrimination and free exercise of religion as both are “an essential component of personhood”);
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 877 (2014)
[hereinafter Culture Wars]; Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims
Have in Common, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 212–27 (2010) [hereinafter Claims Have in
Common]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality,
and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2416–30 (1997).
13. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
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legislative accommodations of religion and show how there are more
examples of legislative accommodations than judicial accommodations.
Part II will dissect the decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop and show how
the Court used dicta to provide a formula for legislative accommodations.
Part III will discuss how legislative accommodations are more appropriate
than judicial accommodations. Part IV will analyze different approaches
to accommodations that have been enacted or proposed. Finally, Part V
will show how current and future issues can be solved by legislative
accommodations. This paper will contend that legislative
accommodations that respect both sides are the best way to balance these
interests.
II. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS OF
RELIGION
When a law has the unintended consequence of requiring a person to
act or refrain from acting in a way that is contrary to his religious beliefs,
the legislature may choose to allow an accommodation for that belief.
However, accommodations are not always given nor required.
Recognizing the need to protect the role of religion in a person’s life,
the people ratified the First Amendment which begins, “Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” 14 This ensured that laws directly affecting a
person’s religion are not allowed. However, it did not define what should
be accommodated under laws that indirectly affect a person’s religion.
Both legislatures and courts have struggled with where exactly to draw
the line to determine what gets accommodated. This section will look at
some of the early debates and accommodations in American history. It
will review the Supreme Court’s treatment of claims under the Free
Exercise Clause. And it will examine the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act’s general approach to religious accommodations.
A.

Religious Accommodations in Early American History

The question of whether accommodations can or should be made for
religious objections to laws has been asked since colonial times. Many
prominent leaders during the colonial period, including Roger Williams,
William Cotton, William Penn, and John Leland, had opinions on when
accommodations were appropriate. In practice, many of the colonies
enacted specific legislative accommodations of religion between the late14.

U.S. CONST. amend I.
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1600s and the late-1700s. These accommodations involved religious
assessments, military conscription, and the requirement of oaths. The first
judicial accommodation of religion did not come until 1813.
In the mid-1600s, Roger Williams, the founder of the Rhode Island
colony, debated the issue of religious accommodations with John Cotton.
A staunch supporter of the freedom of conscience, Williams believed that
government did not have authority over a person’s religious practice.
Cotton argued that denying the government the authority to regulate
religious conduct would undermine the authority of the government in
secular areas. 15 The point of their disagreement centered on the difficulty
of distinguishing between religious practice and secular conduct, as the
two are often somewhat blended. To provide a religious believer the
ability to disobey laws that were contrary to his religious belief is to
dismantle the structure of an ordered society by allowing the disobedience
of any secular laws that blended with religious action. There must be a
balance between accommodations and maintaining the rule of law.
Attempting to identify what type of laws should receive religious
accommodations, William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, argued that
accommodations must “preserve[] the Nation in Peace, Trade, and
Commerce . . . .” Penn would not provide accommodations to “those
excellent Laws, that tend to Sober, Just and Industrious Living.” 16 While
this distinction shows that Penn believed there are times that
accommodations are necessary and there are times when accommodations
are inappropriate, it is still far from certain which accommodations would
be allowed or which laws would be eligible for accommodations.
A century later, John Leland, leader of the Virginia Baptists during
the Revolutionary Era, believed that laws were to be obeyed. “[B]ut when
a man is a peacable subject of the state, he should be protected in
worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience.” 17
Leland’s distinction that accommodations should be allowed when a man
is a peaceable subject of the state did not provide much more clarity.

15. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1447 (1990) (citing THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 18 (1986)). See
Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455
(1991) (defining and applying the four decades of theory on religious freedom penned by Roger
Williams to modern debate).
16. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1447–48 (quoting William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty
of Conscience, 1 A COLLECTION OF THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 457 (London 1726)).
17. Id. at 1448 (quoting John Leland, The Yankee Spy, THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER
JOHN LELAND 213, 228 (G. W. Wood ed., 1845)).
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Colonial leaders had difficulty articulating a theory about exactly
when religious accommodations should be granted. They recognized that
accommodations to laws hindered the order of their society but believed
that free exercise of religion required obedience to God above all else.
This difficulty persists today as the question of where to draw the line is
still being debated.
Despite the difficulty articulating a precise theory, the colonies did
enact legislative accommodations for religious assessments, military
conscription, and requirements of oaths proving that legislative
accommodations of religion are an available option. Prior to the
Revolutionary War, many of the colonies had established religions and
required religious assessments, a form of a tax, to support the established
church. Between the late-1600s and mid-1700s, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia passed different forms of
legislative accommodations allowing those who opposed the established
church to refrain from paying the assessments. 18 Some only
accommodated certain denominations and others required the objector to
pay the assessment to the church of their choice instead. 19
While the accommodation for religious assessments focused on a
clearly religious issue, the next two categories of accommodations were
secular in nature. The issue of mandatory military conscription
encroached on the beliefs of Quakers, Mennonites, and other minority
sects against bearing arms. Maryland, North Carolina, and Rhode Island
passed legislative accommodations before 1700 that exempted those with
religious beliefs opposing military service from the requirement. 20
Pennsylvania, which did not have a militia until 1755, avoided the issue
of religious accommodations by making their militia voluntary. 21 In the
mid-1700s, New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia created an
accommodation for those who were religiously opposed to military
conscription but required the objector to pay a fee or send a substitute.
New Hampshire’s law specifically accommodated Quakers. 22 When the
Revolutionary War broke out, the Continental Congress passed a
18. Id. at 1469.
19. Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 883 (1995);
McConnell, supra note 15, at 1469.
20. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1468. See also Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of
Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1793, 1807–08 (2006) [hereinafter Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior] (discussing
the religious accommodation in Rhode Island’s military conscription law enacted in 1673).
21. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1468.
22. Id.
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resolution accommodating those with religious objections to fighting
from having to obey the requirement for military service and urged them
“to contribute liberally . . . and to do all other services to their oppressed
Country, which they can consistently with their religious principles.” 23
The third category of religious accommodations involved the oath
requirement. Oaths were the primary method used to ensure integrity and
honesty in colonial courts and other aspects of society. Quakers and other
groups had sincere religious objections to swearing oaths that hindered
their ability to take part in the court system. Between 1669 and the 1780s,
nearly all of the colonies passed legislative accommodations to the oath
requirement substituting some other form of pledge or affirmation
instead. 24
The first case of a judicial accommodation of religion came from a
New York state court in 1813 and provided what we know today as the
priest-penitent privilege. 25 In People v. Phillips, Daniel Phillips
knowingly received stolen goods and confessed this sin to his priest,
Father Kohlmann. Kohlmann advised Phillips to return the goods and
offered to deliver the goods to the rightful owner. Kohlmann was
subpoenaed to identify the guilty party before a grand jury. Kohlmann
declared that revealing the details of a confession would make him “a
traitor to my church, to my sacred ministry and to my God” with the result
being “eternal damnation.” 26
The court ruled that Kohlmann could not be required to break the
confidentiality of the confessional. To do so would be to “annihilate” this
sacrament of the Catholic religion. 27 The court stated that everyone would
agree that it would be unacceptable to do something similar to the

23. Id. at 1468–69 (quoting Resolution of July 18, 1775, 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, 187, 189 (W. Ford ed. 1905)).
24. Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior, supra note 20, at 1804–05; McConnell,
supra note 15, at 1767–68. See also David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise
Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241, 266–267 (2005) (discussing early state
constitutional provisions in Maryland and South Carolina exempting certain religions from swearing
testimonial oaths).
25. Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004)
(providing an in-depth analysis of the importance and the impact of this case on current debate about
free exercise accommodations); McConnell, supra note 15, at 1410–12 (citing W. Sampson, THE
CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA 8–9 (1813); Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH.
LAW. 199, 199–209 (1955)).
26. Walsh, supra note 25, at 20–21; McConnell, supra note 15, at 1410–11 (quoting W.
Sampson, CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA 8–9 (1813)).
27. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1504 (quoting Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1
CATH. LAW. 199, 207 (1955)).
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Protestant religion, and to maintain neutrality among beliefs, the court
must extend the same protection to Catholics. 28
Four years later, another New York court distinguished the Phillips
case from a case involving a Protestant confession because enforcing the
subpoena did not violate tenets of that religion. In response, the New York
state legislature passed a legislative accommodation protecting the
confidentiality of a confession for all denominations. 29
B.

The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Free Exercise Claims for
Accommodation
1. The Pre-Sherbert Era

The first time the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of religious
accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause was in 1879. In Reynolds
v. United States, a Mormon man claimed that a federal law prohibiting
polygamy in United States territories violated his religious requirement of
having multiple wives. 30 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
denied the Free Exercise claim. 31
In Reynolds, the Court recognized a distinction between regulating
opinion and actions—Congress had power to regulate certain actions but
was powerless over opinion. 32 The Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment was widely accepted as protective of religious opinion.33
However, the Court feared extending that protection to actions would
“make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land” and would make effectual government non-existent. 34

28. Id. at 1504–05. See also Walsh, supra note 25, at 37–38 (providing another description of
Mayor Clinton’s unanimous decision in the case).
29. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1505–06 (citing People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813)
(unpublished) (reprinted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 209
(1955))).
30. 98 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1879).
31. Id. at 167.
32. Id. at 164. See also id. at 162–64. After a historical review of James Madison’s “Memorial
and Remonstrance,” Thomas Jefferson’s bill for “Establishing Religious Freedom” in the Virginia
House of Delegates prior to the passage of the Bill of Rights, and Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association in response to the adoption of the First Amendment, the Court declared, “Coming
as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost
as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the [First A]mendment thus secured.
Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”
33. Id. at 164.
34. Id. at 166–67.
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In 1940, the Supreme Court applied the Free Exercise Clause to the
states in Cantwell v. Connecticut. 35 The defendant, a Jehovah’s Witness,
was convicted of violating a state ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of
anything of value for a religious, charitable, or philanthropic cause
without a license. In order to obtain a license, the statute required the
person to prove to the secretary of the public welfare council that their
cause was “a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or
philanthropy.” 36 The Court held that the state placing general limits on
solicitation without granting religious accommodations would not violate
the Free Exercise Clause, but requiring a license given at the discretion of
a state official to disseminate religious views was unconstitutional. This
judgment decision by the state could result in targeted censorship of
religious views: the possibility of which violated the protections of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 37
The Court reiterated the dual nature of the Free Exercise Clause—
the freedom to believe and the freedom to act. “The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” 38 While the Court in
Cantwell recognized the freedom to act on religious beliefs had limits, it
found that the state had overreached those limits in requiring a license to
solicit religious materials. Over the next five years, the Court repeatedly
struck down licenses and taxes directed at solicitation of religious
material. 39
2. The Sherbert Test—Compelling Government Interest
In the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh-day Adventist lost her
job when she could not work on Saturdays, the Sabbath according to her
religious beliefs. She was unable to find other work due to this limitation.
Her unemployment compensation benefits were denied because she

35. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
36. Id. at 301–02.
37. Id. at 305–07.
38. Id. at 303–04; Id. at 304 n.4 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145); See Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding an Idaho Territory law forbidding those who practice or advocate bigamy
or polygamy from registering to vote).
39. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down a license tax applied to
Jehovah’s Witness soliciting and distributing literature door-to-door); Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (1944) (declaring the city’s occupational tax on book salesman was invalid as applied
to a Jehovah’s Witness minister who made his living solely on the religious books he sold door-todoor). Contra Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding child labor laws prohibiting
children from selling merchandise on the street when the child is used for street preaching and
solicitation of religious materials).
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refused to accept jobs that required she work on Saturdays. 40 She sued
alleging that the state’s denial of unemployment benefits prohibited her
free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 41
In ruling for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that laws
restricting the exercise of religion must pass strict scrutiny to be valid. 42
This test, known as the Sherbert Test, required that if the person has a
claim involving a sincerely held religious belief and if the government’s
action imposes any burden on the free exercise of the plaintiff’s religion,
the government must show that there is a compelling government interest
justifying the infringement and that the government has pursued that
interest using the least-restrictive and least-burdensome means. 43 This
required the plaintiff to show their exercise of religion was hindered by
the government then shifted the burden to the government to show the
existence of a compelling state interest. 44 The Court pointed out that areas
of compelling state interests are historically those that “posed some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” 45
Even though strict scrutiny was required for laws to overcome the
Free Exercise Clause under Sherbert, the only laws that were struck down
after that decision were those involving unemployment benefits 46 and
compulsory school attendance of fourteen and fifteen-year olds. 47 When
challenged on free exercise grounds, the Court upheld Sunday closing

40. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
41. Id. at 401. See also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (incorporating the First Amendment).
42. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
43. Id. at 402–03, 406–07.
44. Id. at 407.
45. Id. at 403 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1879); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (protecting public health and safety through mandatory smallpox
violations); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (promoting public safety by prohibiting
children from selling merchandise on the street); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)
(protecting women from transportation across state lines for an immoral purpose included
polygamy)).
46. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (allowing appellant who was a
Christian but not a member of any religious sect to be eligible for unemployment compensation when
he turned down a job requiring him to work on Sundays); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (allowing a Seventh-Day Adventist who was discharged for
misconduct for refusing to work on Saturdays to receive unemployment compensation); Thomas v.
Review Bd. Of Ind. Emp’t. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (allowing a Jehovah’s Witness to receive
unemployment compensation when he quit his job after being transferred to a unit building tank turrets
because his religious beliefs would not allow him to build armaments for war).
47. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (permitting Amish families who opposed
high school education of their children as contrary to their religious beliefs to have an exemption to
Wisconsin’s compulsory education laws which required children to attend school until age sixteen).
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laws, 48 laws restricting conscientious objectors to those who object to all
war, 49 the obligation to pay taxes, 50 IRS requirements of racial
nondiscrimination policies for tax-exempt status, 51 military dress code
forbidding yarmulke on duty, 52 the requirement of listing social security
numbers to apply for welfare benefits, 53 and the ability of the government
to build a road and harvest timber in a national park that contained ancient
Indian burial grounds. 54 Even under strict scrutiny, the Court was very
unwilling to provide judicial accommodations for religion.
3. Employment Division v. Smith’s Current Case Law
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith. 55
This case involved two members of the Native American Church who
were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a Schedule I controlled
substance, as part of a religious ceremony. When the men filed for
unemployment compensation, their claims were denied because their jobs
were terminated for “misconduct.” They filed suit claiming a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause. 56
In the opinion, the Court discussed their past reluctance to recognize
free exercise claims for accommodation and classified the claims they did
recognize as “hybrid” claims which combined the free exercise of religion
with some other recognized right. 57 The Supreme Court abandoned the
48. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (denying facial and as-applied challenges to
the Sunday closing laws by an Orthodox Jews who practiced Saturday Sabbath and claimed the forced
closure on Sundays caused them to economic disadvantages due to their religious beliefs).
49. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that separate petitioners, one a
Catholic and one a Humanist, did not qualify for a religious accommodation from the military draft
as conscientious objectors as they only objected to the Vietnam War and not all wars as the law
required).
50. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
(requiring religious groups to pay sales tax on the goods and literature they sold); Tony and Susan
Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (requiring religious foundation to pay minimum
wage); United States v. Lee, 45 U.S. 252 (1982) (requiring Amish to pay Social Security taxes).
51. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (removing tax-exempt status
from religious private university for racial discrimination in admissions).
52. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
53. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding that the requirement of listing a social
security number to obtain welfare benefits did not violate the Native American’s religious belief that
using his daughter’s social security number on the application would “rob her soul”).
54. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
55. Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
56. Id. at 874.
57. Id. at 881–82 (classifying Cantwell v. Connecticut, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, and Follett
v. McCormick as hybrids of free exercise and freedom of speech and press and classifying Pierce v.
Society of Sisters and Wisconsin v. Yoder as hybrids of free exercise and right of parents to dictate the
upbringing of their children).
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Sherbert Test and its requirement of a compelling government interest and
declared that any effect on the free exercise of religion by neutral,
generally applicable laws does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.58
Under this analysis, the Court denied the free exercise claim as Oregon’s
prohibition of peyote was neutral and generally applicable. 59 The Court
reasoned that requiring the political process to create any desired
accommodations to generally applicable laws is favored over allowing
individuals or judges to create exemptions of their own volition. 60
In 1993, the Court applied Smith and unanimously struck down a
municipal ordinance that outlawed ritualistic animal sacrifices in Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. 61 The City of Hialeah, Florida,
had become concerned when members of the Santeria religion, who
practice ritualistic animal sacrifices as part of their faith, announced the
establishment of a church in the city. 62 The city council held emergency
public meetings and adopted resolutions articulating the council’s
commitment to protecting the public from “any and all religious groups
which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.” 63 After
consultation regarding the city’s authority to adopt animal cruelty
measures, the council crafted and adopted ordinances written to
specifically prohibit the Santeria animal sacrifices.64
The Supreme Court found that, while neutral on its face, the
ordinance was not neutral in application. The ordinance was written with
the motivation and effect of prohibiting the religious exercise of the
church. 65 It was both too broad as it regulated more than was needed to
satisfy the city’s interest in protecting public health, and it was also too
narrow because it only regulated the practices of the Santeria religion
while leaving similar public health issues unregulated. 66 The ordinance
fell well below the standard for general applicability as it targeted the
specific practices of the church. 67 Because the ordinance was neither
neutral nor generally applicable, it was subject to strict scrutiny. The

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 878–80, 889.
Id. at 890.
Id.
508 U.S. 520, 527 (1993).
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527–28.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 543–45.
Id. at 543–46.
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Court determined that targeting a religion is not a compelling government
interest and, even if it was, the ordinances were not narrowly tailored. 68
Currently, under Smith and Lukumi, the Free Exercise Clause does
not protect religious practices that are affected by neutral, generally
applicable laws. 69 However, laws that target religious belief or practices
must meet strict scrutiny which requires the government prove that the
law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and that the
law is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 70 This is the baseline
protection of the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.
Legislatures may adopt religious accommodation laws that provide
stricter standards for the protection of religious practices. That is just what
Congress did in response to Smith.
C.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s General Religious
Accommodation

To provide a general religious accommodation, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993 with the purpose to
“restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner” as
Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise.” 71 RFRA provides that any law affecting
the free exercise of religion must meet strict scrutiny regardless of
whether it is neutral and generally applicable. 72 This requirement applied
to all branches and levels of government—federal, state, and local. 73
Congress recognized that neutral laws have the ability to burden free
exercise of religion just as much as laws that target religious exercise. 74
RFRA was introduced to provide stronger protections and greater
accommodations for the exercise of religion. It received overwhelming
support and passed nearly unanimously. 75
In 1997, the Supreme Court severely limited the effect of RFRA. In
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that Congress had exceeded its
enforcement power in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted
RFRA. 76 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 546–47.
Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–80, 889 (1990).
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-104, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
Id. at 1488–89.
Id. at 1489.
Id. at 1488.
H.R. 1308, 103rd Cong. (1993–1994).
521 U.S. 507, 511, 536 (1997).
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authority to enforce the rights granted by that amendment against
infringement by the states and local governments. 77 The Court deemed
this enforcement power to be “remedial.” 78 This remedial enforcement
allowed Congress to enact laws that protected rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment such as the Free Exercise Clause. However, the
enforcement power did not give Congress the ability to redefine or
broaden Constitutional rights. 79 The Court found that RFRA attempted to
broaden the protections of the Free Exercise Clause as defined in Smith
which was outside the scope of Congress’ power. 80 This decision in
Boerne made RFRA only applicable to the federal government reinstating
the Smith rule for state and local cases. As of 2015, 21 states have adopted
their own version of RFRA which provides similar protections at the state
and local level of government. 81
The most well-known case to use RFRA to uphold a free exercise
claim was Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 82 In 2014, the owners of
three closely-held corporations challenged a United States Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate issued after enactment of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) that required
corporations to provide health insurance that included all FDA-approved
contraceptive methods. 83 The petitioners argued that the requirement
violated their sincerely held religious beliefs regarding the beginning of
human life as four of the required contraceptives prevented the
development of an already fertilized egg. The Supreme Court held that
while the government had a compelling interest in ensuring adequate

77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
78. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
79. Id. at 519.
80. Id. at 511, 536.
81. Kathleen A. Brady, Law and Religion in an Increasingly Polarized America: The
Disappearance of Religion from Debates about Religious Accommodation, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1093, 1095 (2017) (citing Culture Wars, supra note 12, at 845 & n. 26); State Religious Freedom
CONF.
OF
ST.
LEGISLATURES
(May
4,
2017),
Restoration
Acts,
NAT’L
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/33ZS-XBBJ] (listing the states that have passed statutes similar to the federal
RFRA: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia); see also Federal & State RFRA Map, BECKET,
https://www.becketlaw.org/research-central/rfra-info-central/map/
[https://perma.cc/EB79-3FP6]
(noting that in addition to these, nine states have provisions in their state constitutions requiring strict
scrutiny for free exercise claims: Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin).
82. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
83. Id. at 2762.
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health care, the numerous exemptions and alternatives offered to other
groups showed that the requirement in this case was not the leastrestrictive means of achieving that interest.84 The Hobby Lobby case is
illustrative of how legislative accommodations can provide stronger
protections for those claiming the law has infringed on the free exercise
of religion.
III. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S FORMULA FOR LEGISLATIVE
ACCOMMODATIONS
A.

The Narrow Holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop

In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, a same-sex couple entered a bakery to order a cake for their
upcoming wedding. The owner of the bakery, Jack Phillips, refused to
design them a custom cake for their wedding. He offered to sell them other
cakes or goods but does not bake cakes for same-sex weddings due to his
religious beliefs opposing same-sex marriage. 85
The couple filed a complaint under the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act (CADA) with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
claiming discrimination by Phillips.86 CADA provides, “It is a
discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly,
to refuse, withhold from, or deny to any individual or a group, because
of . . . sexual orientation, . . . the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place
of public accommodation.” 87 Phillips claimed that requiring him to design
and bake a cake for a same-sex wedding would violate his First
Amendment freedom of speech as an artist and violate his free exercise of
religion. 88 Colorado does not have a state version of the RFRA which
would subject CADA to strict scrutiny. 89 Because the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was held not to apply to the states in City of
Boerne 90 and Colorado does not have its own version, CADA is subject
to the rational basis standard set forth in Smith.

84. Id. at 2781–82.
85. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
86. Id. at 1725.
87. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West 2019).
88. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
89. See supra note 81 (listing the states that have statutes or constitutional provisions requiring
strict scrutiny for free exercise claims).
90. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 536 (1997).
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The Commission rejected the baker’s Constitutional claims and ruled
for the couple. They found that, under Employment Division v. Smith,
CADA was a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” that did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause. 91 The Commission ordered Phillips to
“cease and desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by
refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [he] would sell to
heterosexual couples,” to conduct staff trainings on the requirements of
CADA and to complete quarterly reports for two years indicating any time
a customer was denied service. 92 Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court
of Appeals which affirmed the ruling. 93 The Colorado Supreme Court
denied to hear the case. 94
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, Phillips’s
strongest argument seemed to be based on the freedom of speech or a
“hybrid claim” between freedom of speech and free exercise. Indeed,
much of the briefing and oral argument in favor of Phillips revolved
around whether baking a custom wedding cake was an expression or
speech. 95 Under Smith, it would be difficult for Phillips to overcome this
neutral and generally applicable law on strictly a free exercise claim.
The case was expected to have major ramifications. If the Court
decided in favor of the couple, it would limit the freedom of speech and
free exercise of religion and compel a person to act in opposition to their
religious beliefs. If the Court decided in favor of the baker, it would limit
the effect of anti-discrimination laws, allow numerous other types of
business owners to discriminate, and demean the dignity of same-sex
couples throughout the country. 96 Either way, both sides viewed the final
result to be a potential winner-take-all scenario.

91. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1726–27.
94. Id. at 1727.
95. See Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No 16-111); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No 16-111)
[hereinafter Brief for the United States] (declining to even make the free exercise argument in the
brief); Transcript of Oral Argument, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No 16-111) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
96. See Julie Moreau, Analysis: Masterpiece Cakeshop case could have ‘tremendous
implications’, NBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/analysismasterpiece-cakeshop-case-could-have-tremendous-implications-n826951 [https://perma.cc/Q945HPNZ]; Henry Gass, Religious liberty or right to discriminate? High court to hear arguments in
wedding cake case, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Justice/2017/1204/Religious-liberty-or-right-to-discriminate-High-court-to-hear-arguments-inwedding-cake-case [https://perma.cc/EB7Q-E9YE].
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Instead of answering the question of whether CADA required
Phillips to create the custom cake in opposition to his religious beliefs, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals
because it found that commissioners on the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission had exhibited animosity toward the baker’s religion. 97 The
Court pointed out other cases where the commission rejected
discrimination claims when bakers refused to make cakes that opposed
same-sex persons or marriages. 98 The Court also pointed to what it
interpreted to be outright animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs by the
commissioners during public hearings. 99 One commissioner claimed that
religion had been used to justify slavery and the holocaust and that
religion is “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can
use.” 100
The Court cited the Free Exercise Clause’s protection from “subtle
departures from neutrality” 101 and relied on its decision in Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah to find that the commission was not
neutral in adjudicating the baker’s religious claim. 102
While Phillips technically won as the ruling against him was
reversed, the narrow animosity finding was the Court’s way of avoiding a
winner-take-all decision that forced the losing side to suffer “undue
disrespect” or be subject to “indignities.” 103
B.

The Broader Formula for Legislative Accommodations in
Masterpiece Cakeshop

Although the Court’s holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop was narrow,
the opinion can be read as a plea for legislative accommodations. By not
deciding the big issue in the case, the Court avoided declaring one side
the big winner and the other side the big loser and left open the
opportunity for the issue to be decided through the legislative process in
a way that satisfied both parties.
The Court began its analysis by recognizing the importance of
protecting the civil rights of same-sex couples as well as the views and
97. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
98. Id. at 1728 (citing Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Colo. Civ. Rights Div. Charge No. P20140071X,
“Determination” (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Colo. Civ. Rights Div. Charge No.
P20140070X, “Determination” (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Colo. Civ. Rights Div.
Charge No. P20140069X, “Determination” (Mar. 24, 2015)).
99. Id. at 1729.
100. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument p. 11–12).
101. Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)).
102. Id. at 1732.
103. Id.
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(“in some instances”) expression of those who have religious objections
to same-sex marriage. 104 It recognized the “general rule” that religious
objections do not overcome neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations laws 105 but also assumed that it would be a denial of free
exercise protections to compel a member of the clergy who opposes samesex marriage to perform the wedding ceremony for a same-sex couple. 106
The Court then came to the difficulty behind the issue in the case. “Yet if
that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons who provide
goods and services for gay marriages and weddings might refuse to do so
for gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsistent
with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws.” 107
After discussing the finding of animosity toward Phillips, the Court
closed the opinion with a formula for how this issue should be resolved in
the future. It stated, “[T]hese disputes must be resolved [1] with tolerance,
[2] without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and [3] without
subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services
in an open market.” 108 The following sections will contend that the best
method of balancing the rights of same-sex couples and religious
objectors would be through legislative accommodations that incorporate
these three principles.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS OVER
JUDICIAL ACCOMMODATIONS
Historically, the Court has been reluctant to grant religious
accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause, especially when the
accommodations infringed on someone else’s rights or liberties. 109 Justice
Scalia’s analysis of the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence in Smith
104. Id. at 1727.
105. Id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.8 (1968) (per
curiam) (noting that defendant’s beliefs that the law requiring the restaurant to serve African
Americans “contravene[d] the will of God” and violated his free exercise of religion were patently
frivolous); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995) (“Provisions like these are well within the State’s usual power to enact when a legislature has
reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter,
violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments.”); see also Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
263 n.3 (1982)).
106. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1732.
109. See supra Section I.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of free exercise claims).
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pointed out the consistency with which the Court denied religious
accommodations. 110 He noted the only times the Court has upheld claims
for religious accommodations were for unemployment compensation
where the government had already instituted secular accommodations 111
or hybrid claims that combined freedom of speech, association, or press
with the freedom of religion. 112 In holding that neutral and generally
applicable laws would ordinarily survive free exercise claims, Smith
recognized that the main avenue for religious accommodations would be
through legislation. 113 In fact, a 1992 study conducted by James Ryan
concluded that state and federal statutes contained an estimated 2,000
religious accommodations. 114 While this is a rough ballpark number, it
shows the more influential role of legislative accommodations when
compared to the minimal number of judicial accommodations of religion.
This is not to say that judicial accommodations of religion are not
appropriate in certain situations. That is the role of judicial review.
However, the distinct line drawing and balancing required to resolve these
disputes would better be accomplished by the legislature. The
constitutional principle of separation of powers favors legislative
accommodations of religion in two ways. First, Congress’s Constitutional
authority to create law makes legislative accommodations of religion
more legitimate than judicial accommodations. Second, the legislative
process makes Congress more competent than the courts to create
religious accommodations.
A.

The Greater Legitimacy of Legislative Accommodations

It is elementary that the idea of separation of powers is one of the
hallmarks of the American form of government. While separation of
powers is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, the structure of
that foundational document illustrates the belief of James Madison that,
“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, . . . may justly be

110. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–85 (1990).
111. Id. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
112. Id. at 881–82; supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Telescope Media Grp. v.
Lucero, 936 F.3d, 740, 762 (8th Cir. 2019) (reversing dismissal and allowing wedding videographer’s
case to proceed as hybrid speech and religion claim).
113. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (citing the Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico laws that had
granted accommodations for sacramental peyote use).
114. Culture Wars, supra note 12, at 844–45 (2014) (citing James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992)).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss1/6

20

Brown: <i>Masterpiece Cakeshop</i>

2019]

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP

197

pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” 115 Madison concluded, “[T]he
preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power
should be separate and distinct.” 116 This is why the Constitution vests all
legislative powers only in Congress 117 and judicial power only in the
courts. 118
Congress is the people’s branch. The 435 Representatives in the
House and 100 Senators are elected directly by the people and are
accountable to the people for re-election at the end of their term. The
actions of these members of Congress is believed to represent the will of
the people.
The legislative process is intentionally designed to make sure only
the best and most popular bills become law, thus giving the law
legitimacy. The bicameral structure of Congress requires the bill to pass
two separate chambers—the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Public debate occurs in the hearings of committees of both the House and
the Senate as well as on the floor of both chambers. There are numerous
places in each chamber where a bill could be defeated. The relatively few
bills that make it through and receive a majority vote in both chambers
are then presented to the President for his approval or veto before
becoming law. This laborious process of bicameral approval and
presentment give laws legitimacy. 119 It is true that this process makes it
difficult to pass bills without using much political will, especially in the
polarized political environment of our day, but that does not mean that it
is impossible. 120 The result of this legislative process rarely satisfies
everyone, but it allows those who disagree with the new law to take

115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Lecture: Politicians in Robes: The Separation of Powers and the Problem
of Judicial Legislation, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 31, 35–36 (2015) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (“The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization
in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document they drafted in Philadelphia in the
summer of 1787.”)).
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
118. Id. at art. III, § 1.
119. See O’Scannlain, supra note 115, at 37.
120. See Kelsey Dallas, What does it take to craft compromise legislation on religious freedom
and LGBT rights? In Boise, policymakers search for an answer, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/900057139/what-does-it-take-to-craft-compromiselegislation-on-religious-freedom-and-lgbt-rights-heres-what-we-learned-in-boise.html
[https://perma.cc/B55R-4JYL]; Sen. Hill: No Add the Words Legislation This Session, IDAHO NEWS
(Feb. 21, 2019), https://idahonews.com/news/local/sen-hill-no-add-the-words-legislation-thissession [https://perma.cc/2F8W-LM7H] (providing Idaho Senator Brent Hill’s full statement on
compromise legislation and responses from local groups).
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confidence in the fairness of the system and gives them the opportunity to
change the law in the future. 121
The Supreme Court was not designed to specialize in making law. It
was designed to decide “cases” and “controversies” 122 and exercise
judicial review to ensure laws are not “repugnant to the Constitution.” 123
It is true that by way of judicial review the Court recognizes exceptions
not previously in the law or voids portions of the law thereby creating new
law. 124 As discussed already, this is true even in free exercise
jurisprudence. 125 This paper is not arguing that the Court cannot make
law, although there may be a place for that argument elsewhere. This
paper is arguing that the legislative branch is the better option. 126 The
Supreme Court is not the best forum to create religious exemptions in
these disputes as its structure does not provide the legitimacy that comes
from the legislative branch.
The Supreme Court is filled with nine justices who are appointed for
life-long terms. These justices are not accountable to anyone for their
decisions. They do not have to answer to the people nor listen to public
opinion as they are not elected. This insulation is good when justices are
meant to fairly and neutrally decide cases and controversies or even strike
down laws that violate the Constitution. There is no outside pressure. This
insulation is bad when justices significantly alter public policy and make
law. It removes the people as the source of power and allows for the
tyranny Madison described. 127 Under the Constitution, there is no
legitimacy in our laws when our lawmakers are not accountable to the
people.

121. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
122. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
123. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
124. McConnell, supra note 15, at 1444–45, 1509–10 (1990) (arguing that the ability of courts
to create exemptions and accommodations stems from their power of judicial review. Once the court
is granted the authority to review the constitutionality of the laws passed by the legislature, the court
has the authority to determine whether Constitutional protections such as the Free Exercise Clause
require an accommodation to that law in order for the law to be valid.)
125. See supra notes 35–47 and accompanying text (discussing cases where free exercise claims
were granted by the Court).
126. Compare Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case
for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45
U.S. FLA. L. REV. 389, 391 (2010) (noting that Emp’t Div. v. Smith has largely removed religious
accommodations from the judicial sphere), with Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 59 (2018) [hereinafter Wedding-Vendor Cases] (recognizing that
legislators are unwilling or unable to create accommodations for politically unpopular religions such
as Muslims or even “conservative Christians in blue states”).
127. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 115, at 298.
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The Greater Competency of Legislative Accommodations

The legislative process is designed to make sure the bills competently
solve the issues they are designed to remedy. House and Senate
committees hold public hearings and invite testimony from experts to
educate the members on the issue and potential ways to solve it. Members
may offer amendments to a bill to reflect technical knowledge or public
opinion gained during both formal and informal political debate. Congress
is given wide latitude to review any information, statistic, or circumstance
when fashioning the bill, and it will often use the input given to precisely
define the provisions of the new law giving the public a clear
understanding of the new law’s requirements. This attention to detail and
ability to incorporate input from a myriad of perspectives provides
competence to the law.
The restriction of the Supreme Court to decide cases and
controversies reduces the Court’s competence when it decides to make
laws. When a law is made, Congress starts with a clean slate and fashions
the law to remedy the situation adding different provisions to ensure the
law solves any problems created by the right or restriction and addresses
everyone’s concerns. On the other hand, the Court is a “blunt instrument”
that is limited to the current set of facts before it.128 It does not have the
same freedom to create law with precision. It must create the law around
the current set of facts and wait for another case to fill in any gaps. The
doctrine of stare decisis also theoretically limits the options available to
the Court by requiring the Court to follow or rationalize the new law with
its prior decisions, even though in practice the Court has occasionally
ignored this duty. 129 These restrictions to cases and controversies lower
the competence of judge-made law.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court would have been
limited to deciding whether a baker was allowed to decline to bake a
custom wedding cake for a same-sex marriage. If it wanted to broaden the
accommodation, the Court might have been able to decide whether
wedding vendors were able to decline to provide services for same-sex

128. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
129. Compare Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011,
1018–19 (2003) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[E]ven in
constitutional cases, the doctrine [of stare decisis] carries such persuasive force that we have always
required a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification.’”)) with
Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1072 (2008) (pointing
out that the recent Supreme Court trend of “underruling,” ruling against recent precedent without
acknowledging that it was overruling the precedent or rationalizing the change in doctrine, is
undermining the practical effect of stare decisis).
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marriages. However without another case presenting a different set of
facts, the Court would not have been able to adequately define which
wedding vendors the accommodation applied to or any restrictions on
what kind of services were covered by the accommodation. Further, the
Court would be limited in the protections it could provide for same-sex
couples to the facts of the case. To create further precision in the
accommodation, the Court would have to wait for another case with the
proper set of facts. The legislative branch is far more competent in
creating religious accommodations.
V. MODERN PROPOSALS AND EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATIVE
ACCOMMODATIONS
A.

Possible Legislative Accommodations that Satisfy Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s Formula

Legislative accommodations of religion are nothing new. As we have
seen, they have been used since before the Revolution and roughly 2,000
are in effect today. 130 In implementing Masterpiece Cakeshop’s formula
for solving this issue, what accommodations should be given and what
lines should be drawn to ensure tolerance and respect for both sides? This
section will examine three proposed approaches.
1. Religious Liberty Professors’ Approach to Accommodations
Professors Thomas C. Berg, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and others have
worked together to draft a proposed religious accommodation in the realm
of same-sex marriage. It reads:
No individual, no religious corporation, association or organization, and
no nonprofit organization owned, controlled or operated by a bona fide
religious corporation shall be penalized or denied benefits under the
laws of this state or any subdivision of this state, including but not
limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public
accommodations, licensing, government grants or contracts, or taxexempt status, for refusing to provide services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization
of any marriage, for refusing to solemnize any marriage, or for refusing
to treat as valid any marriage, where such providing, solemnizing, or
treating as valid would cause that individual, corporation, association or

130.

See supra Sections I.A and I.C and note 114 with accompanying text.
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organization to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs, provided
that
(a) a refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization of any
marriage shall not be protected under this section where (i) a party
to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges
elsewhere and (ii) such inability to obtain similar services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges
elsewhere constitutes a substantial hardship; and
(b) no government official may refuse to solemnize a marriage if
another government official is not available and willing to do so. 131

This “marriage conscience protection” was drafted before the
Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage and was advocated to be
included when a state recognized same-sex marriage. 132 These professors
recognized that legalizing same-sex marriage without providing for
religious accommodations would create widespread and unnecessary
conflict. 133 This decade-old argument seems prophetic now that we have
seen cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop filter through the courts.
Professor Berg argues that this accommodation should extend
beyond churches to any religious organization whether it be an
“educational institution, society, charity, or fraternal organization,” to any
individual in the scope of employment by these religious organizations,
and to situations “beyond the marriage ceremony.” 134 He also argues that
these religious accommodations should extend to the commercial sphere
in a limited context. He notes how small businesses embody the beliefs
131. Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor of Law, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, et al., to
John Baldacci, Governor, Maine., at 9 (Oct. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from Berg to Governor
Baldacci],
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/wilson-et-al-to-governor-maine-100509.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GL9-A9P5]. See also Claims Have in Common, supra note 12; Marc D. Stern,
Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 307, 307 (2010); Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex
Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2010).
132. Letter from Berg to Governor Baldacci, supra note 131, at 8; Thomas C. Berg, Archive:
Memos/Letters on Religious Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Aug. 2, 2009)
[hereinafter
Memos/Letters],
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/
memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/4HQR-ERFB].
133. Letter from Berg to Governor Baldacci, supra note 131, at 2 (citing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK
ET AL., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock,
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., Rowman & Littlefield 2008) (including
contributions from both supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage) (parenthetical in original
citation)).
134. Claims Have in Common, supra note 12, at 227.
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and identity of their owners and how not accommodating the small
landlord or wedding photographer is akin to asking these small business
owners to segment their identity and leave their religion out of their
business. 135
Professor Douglas Laycock, who supports the type of religious
accommodation drafted by Professor Berg and others above, 136 would
limit the accommodations to the context of the wedding, marriage, or
sexual relationship. He would only accommodate small businesses where
the owner is providing the services personally and only if another vendor
is available. 137
As provisions (a) and (b) show, the accommodations have limits. If
the same-sex couple is unable to receive the goods or services from a
willing provider, the accommodation does not apply, and the religious
objector is required to provide the goods or services. It is provisions such
as these that help prevent any potential harmful effects that “subject[] gay
persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open
market.” 138 Professor Berg argues that the two ways to minimize harmful
effects are notice and alternative providers.139 Providing notice of a
business’s religious objections before service is requested limits the harm
to the person’s dignity that comes from a surprise refusal of service. Some
might argue that refusal via prior notice could cause the same injury that
refusal in-person causes. This may be true, but if religious objections and
harm to the dignity of the religious adherent are to be taken seriously in
the commercial context, religious accommodations would require the
person to find out about the objections at some point. Receiving notice
early is better than being refused service in person. 140 Requiring
alternative providers be available also reduces the harm to the person’s
dignity because it ensures that they are still able to receive the goods or
services. 141 Notice and alternative providers are appropriate limits to
religious accommodations.
135. Id. at 227–28.
136. See Memos/Letters, supra note 132; Letter from Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law, Univ.
of Mich. Law Sch., to John Baldacci, Governor, Maine, at 1 (April 30, 2009),
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/maineexemptionsbaldacci1.doc
[https://perma.cc/8DPGBGSC].
137. Wedding-Vendor Cases, supra note 126, at 63.
138. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
139. Thomas C. Berg, A Case for Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1341, 1369 (2016) [hereinafter Accommodating Religious Nonprofits] (arguing for religious
accommodations in the context of providing contraception).
140. Id. at 1369–71 (2016); See also Laycock, Wedding-Vendor Cases, supra note 126, at 63–
64.
141. Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, supra note 139, at 1371.
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2. Professor Brownstein’s “Religious Discrimination” Approach
to Religious Accommodations
Professor Alan Brownstein has offered a different model for
approaching whether to provide a religious accommodation. He refers to
it as the religious discrimination model. This approach would provide a
religious accommodation to situations involving same-sex marriage if a
comparable accommodation would be allowed if the situation involved
differences in religion. 142
For example, under Professor Brownstein’s approach, a religious
school or other educational organization that is permitted to discriminate
on the basis of religion for admission would similarly be allowed to refuse
admission to an LGBT individual. However, a religious hospital who
would not be able to refuse to treat someone of another religion would not
be allowed to refuse to treat someone based on their sexual orientation. 143
In the commercial context, Professor Brownstein uses the example
of how a hotel turning away its honeymoon suite to a Jewish or Muslim
couple would be deemed unacceptable. So to, then, must it be
unacceptable for a hotel to refuse to rent its honeymoon suite to a samesex couple. 144 When it comes to same-sex weddings, the “religious
discrimination” approach would ask “whether we would protect the same
class of proprietors from being required to assist in or promote the
solemnization or celebration or any religious life cycle event.” 145
Professor Brownstein offers the example of a florist and admits the
potential of a local florist refusing to serve him because of his Jewish
beliefs is “an unpalatable prospect.” 146
In the implementation of those accommodations deemed valid under
his “religious discrimination” approach, Professor Brownstein argues that
the government should assume the responsibility of compiling
information about who has religious objections. He sees this as the way
of limiting dignitary harm to same-sex couples. 147 He also places the
burden on the government to provide alternatives for healthcare that is
denied due to a religious objection from the employer. 148 In this aspect,
Professor Brownstein accurately predicted the factual result of Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby which granted a religious accommodation to closely-held,
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Brownstein, supra note 126, at 422.
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 436.
Id.
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for-profit corporations who objected to the contraceptive mandate in the
Affordable Care Act. 149
Professor Brownstein’s “religious discrimination” approach is more
of a theory model behind religious objections rather than a concrete
approach. He even describes it as a model and recognizes that it does not
provide all the answers. 150 However, it does provide us with a way for
those who can only see the debate from their side to gain a different
perspective by rephrasing the issue. 151
3. The Government’s Approach in its Masterpiece Cakeshop
amicus brief
Interestingly, the United States submitted an amicus brief in
Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Solicitor General participated in oral
argument in support of religious accommodations for the baker. 152
Understanding that this approach for religious accommodations was made
within the limited scope of a case before the Supreme Court, we may still
pull out principles to help us in forming legislative accommodations.
Like most arguments favoring the baker in this case, the
government’s argument focused on the religious objection to the
compelled expression of celebrating the same-sex wedding. 153 At oral
argument, the Solicitor General offered the analogy of compelling the
religious baker to create a custom wedding cake for a same-sex marriage
to compelling an African-American sculptor to create a cross for a Ku
Klux Klan service. 154 The government’s preferred test proposed that only
activities that compel “[1] expression and [2] participation in an
expressive event” should be subject to heightened scrutiny. 155 This
accommodation applies only to those who satisfy both elements. This test
eliminates certain wedding vendors such as venues, transportation
services, and lodging. 156 The government argued that the baker in this case
satisfied both elements as he created a custom wedding cake which can
be likened “to a sculptural centerpiece” that symbolizes the celebration of

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014).
Brownstein, supra note 126, at 423.
Id. at 423–24.
Brief for the United States, supra note 95.
Id. at 14.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 95, at 26–27.
Brief for the United States, supra note 95, at 14.
Id. at 21–22.
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the wedding, and the cake’s central role in the celebration is likened to the
artist participating in the event. 157
Because this was a legal argument designed to persuade the Supreme
Court, it mirrors the “hybrid claim” analysis in Smith. 158 In this case, the
government is arguing for a hybrid between freedom of religion and
freedom of speech.
The principle of not compelling someone to “speak” and participate
in an event they are opposed to provides, at minimum, a baseline for
creating religious accommodations. 159
B.

Modern Examples of Legislative Accommodations for Religion

There are several modern examples of legislative accommodations
for religion that relate to same-sex marriage and LGBT. These examples
show how the legislature was able to bring both sides together to create a
solution that worked for everyone. No one was able to get everything they
wanted, but both sides were protected from significantly losing. These
examples include the Utah Compromise, Rowan County Clerk Kim
Davis, and accommodations in North Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi.
1. Utah Compromise
The Utah Compromise is the name given to a pair of bills passed by
the State of Utah in 2015 just a few months prior to the Supreme Court’s
recognition of same-sex marriage in Obergefell. 160 This bipartisan effort
passed both LGBT and religious freedom protections. Some of the
specific accommodations include protections for LGBT individuals from
housing and employment discrimination while allowing employers to
determine reasonable dress standards and designate sex-specific
facilities. 161 It also allows religious and small employers to use religious
principles in hiring. The compromise protects equally the freedom of
speech for both groups in the workplace. 162 It allows religious
organizations who own housing facilities to give preference to those of

157. Id. at 24–27, 29.
158. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). See also supra notes 57, 95, and 112
and accompanying text.
159. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 95, at 45–46.
160. See Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, 2015 Utah Laws 68–82;
Protections for Religious Expression and Beliefs about Marriage, Family, or Sexuality, 2015 Utah
Laws 214–18.
161. Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, 2015 Utah Laws 68–82.
162. Id.
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their own faith and for small landlords to use their personal preference in
choosing tenants. 163
Some of the biggest aspects of the Utah Compromise are the
recognition of same-sex marriage and the corresponding protection for
those who advocate for traditional marriage. 164 Under this law, religious
officials cannot be compelled to perform weddings against their religious
beliefs. Religious organizations cannot be forced to use their facilities for
weddings that are contrary to their faith and cannot lose their tax-exempt
status for refusing to participate in such weddings. 165 Individuals who
speak their views on marriage, family, and sexuality outside of
professional settings cannot lose their professional license. 166
While this type of bargaining for same-sex recognition is no longer
available now that the Supreme Court has recognized same-sex marriage
as a fundamental right, the concept of bringing both sides together to find
a compromise is still viable. This is exactly what the Court called for in
Masterpiece Cakeshop—”[T]hese disputes must be resolved with
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and
without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and
services in an open market.” 167 Legislatures can still pass laws that define
when someone with religious objections to participating in a same-sex
wedding may be exempt from complying with generally-applicable antidiscrimination laws and that also ensure same-sex couples have the ability
to receive services in the open market.
2. Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis
Besides Masterpiece Cakeshop, the most widely recognized instance
of a same-sex couple being denied service for their wedding involves Kim
Davis, the county clerk in Rowan County, Kentucky. This case is a prime
example of how an accommodation by the legislature calmed an intense
battle in the courts. In the end, both sides claimed victory. 168
Upon learning of the Supreme Court’s recognition of same-sex
marriage in Obergefell, Davis refused to issue any marriage licenses from
163. Id.
164. Protections for Religious Expression and Beliefs about Marriage, Family, or Sexuality,
2015 Utah Laws 214–218.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
168. See Corky Siemaszko, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis, Who Refused to Issue Marriage
Licenses to Gays, Seeks to End Case, NBC NEWS (June 21, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-who-refused-issue-marriage-licenses-gays-n596476
[https://perma.cc/KW2M-ZAE2].
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her office citing her religious beliefs against same-sex marriage. 169
Marriage licenses in Kentucky included an authorization statement of the
county clerk recognizing the couple on the license is authorized to
marry. 170 Davis believed this authorization statement combined with her
name as county clerk on the form served as an endorsement of same-sex
marriage. 171 When a lawsuit arose, the district court denied Davis’ free
exercise claim and issued an injunction against her requiring her to issue
marriage licenses. 172 Despite the injunction, Davis continued to refuse to
issue marriage licenses. The district court judge held Davis in contempt
and placed her in jail. 173
In response, the Kentucky General Assembly amended the
requirements of the marriage license. The license no longer needed to
contain the name of the county clerk and could be signed by a deputyclerk. 174 Since the new legislation resolved Davis’s objections, the Sixth
Circuit dismissed the appeal as being moot and ordered the district court
to vacate the injunction. 175 Kim Davis and all other Kentucky county
clerks received an accommodation from the Kentucky legislature as they
no longer had to personally authorize same-sex marriages, and same-sex
couples in Rowan County and across the state were assured they could
obtain a marriage license at their local county clerk’s office. A simple
adjustment to the law by the legislature created an amicable conclusion to
a passionate court battle.
3. North Carolina’s Accommodations
Just weeks before the Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage
in Obergefell, the North Carolina legislature passed a law over the
governor’s veto that provided for accommodations for magistrates to
recuse themselves from performing all marriages and assistant or deputy
registrar of deeds to recuse themselves from issuing all marriage
certificates. 176 The text does not mention the registrar of deeds which
implies the accommodation only applies to assistants and deputies. The
law also provided for the Administrative Office of the Courts to ensure
169. Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
170. Id. at 931.
171. Id. at 932.
172. Id. at 944.
173. See Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-samesex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/X8UA-NAAU].
174. See 2016 Ky. Acts 132.
175. Miller v. Davis, 667 F. App’x 537, 538 (6th Cir. 2016).
176. See 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 75, § 1(a)–(b).
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that all jurisdictions had access to a magistrate willing to perform
marriages. 177 This compromise gave government employees with
religious objections to same-sex marriage an accommodation while
ensuring same-sex couples the ability to receive marriage licenses and to
solemnize their marriage.
4. One-sided Religious Protections in Response to Obergefell
Several state legislatures passed religious protections as a result of
the Court’s decision in Obergefell. Legislatures in Georgia and
Mississippi passed bills to protect those who had religious beliefs that
opposed same-sex marriage but did not provide much protection for samesex couples.
Georgia’s legislature passed “An Act to Protect Religious
Freedoms.” The bill would have provided significant protections for those
who had religious objections to same-sex marriage including members of
the clergy and faith-based organizations. 178 It also served as a state
Religious Freedom Restoration Act that would have required the
compelling government interest test for a burden by the state on a person’s
exercise of religion. 179 After Coca-Cola, Disney, the NFL, and other major
corporations threatened a boycott of the state, Georgia Governor Nathan
Deal vetoed the bill. 180
Georgia’s religious freedom bill likely would have been more
accepted if it had listed provisions that specifically protected same-sex
couples. Because it only offered specific protections to religious
objectors, it became extremely unpopular and was vetoed.
Mississippi passed the “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from
Government Discrimination Act” in 2016. 181 This law recognized the
sincerely held religious belief of traditional marriage. 182 It also prevented
the state from discriminating against religious organizations who make
certain decisions due to the organizations’ belief in traditional marriage. 183
Among other things, the law prevented the state from discriminating
177. Id. at § 1(c).
178. See Free Exercise Protection Act, Ga. Gen. Assemb., H.B. 757, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess., §§ 2, 4 (Ga. 2016).
179. Id. at § 6.
180. See Ralph Ellis & Emanuella Grinberg, Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal to Veto ‘Religious
Liberty’ Bill, CNN (Mar. 28, 2016, 5:46PM) https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/28/us/georgia-northcarolina-lgbt-bills/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZB6X-UU82].
181. See Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, Miss. Leg.,
H.B. 1523, 2016 Miss. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016).
182. See id. at § 2.
183. See id. at § 3(1).
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against persons or organizations who use their belief in traditional
marriage to decline to place foster children with same-sex couples, or to
provide services for same-sex weddings, or in the case of state employees
to recuse themselves from authorizing or licensing same-sex marriages. 184
Like Georgia’s law, this Mississippi law did not offer any specific
protections for the dignity of same-sex couples.
Those opposed to this new law filed suit claiming that it violated the
Establishment Clause because section two endorsed a specific religious
belief and violated the Equal Protection Clause because it provided
stronger protections for those who believed in traditional marriage than
those who believed in same-sex marriage. The district court granted a
preliminary injunction against the law, 185 but the Fifth Circuit dismissed
the case for lack of standing. 186
These laws in Georgia and Mississippi faced much opposition and
did little to resolve the overall dispute. Had these laws been closer to
Utah’s laws which provided protections for both sides, they would have
had wider support and satisfied Masterpiece Cakeshop’s formula for
finding a balance between same-sex rights and religious rights.
When it comes to existing religious accommodations, there are some
that have provided a good balance of protections for both same-sex
couples and religious objectors, and there are others that have provided
lopsided protections. Those that are balanced have been accepted while
those that are lopsided have faced significant political pressure and legal
challenges. To truly solve the dispute, they “must be resolved with
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and
without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and
services in an open market.” 187
VI. THE APPLICATION OF LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS TO
CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES
The legislature, whether state or federal, has broad power to
accommodate religion. However, we have seen that when a legislature
goes too far in protecting religious objectors without also expressing
tolerance and protecting the dignity of LGBT individuals, the situation is
not resolved and usually escalates. Masterpiece Cakeshop’s formula has
proven to be needed.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See id. at § 3.
Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 724 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 358 (5th Cir. 2017).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
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This article has shown how three different proposals—from the
religious liberty professors, Professor Brownstein, and the government—
uniquely satisfy the formula of resolving these disputes “with tolerance,
without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without
subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services
in an open market.” 188
Moving forward, how can we use this these proposals and the
formula from Masterpiece Cakeshop to resolve this dispute? There are
three main categories that are currently still being debated: wedding
vendors, adoption agencies, and government officials.
A.

Wedding Vendors

The most current issue is the one unanswered by Masterpiece
Cakeshop—whether wedding vendors, or any particular type of wedding
vendor, are able to refuse to serve a same-sex wedding. Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s formula implies that there should be at least some
compromise by both sides. The religious liberty professor’s approach
would accommodate wedding vendors as long as there are other vendors
available to provide those services without substantial hardship. Professor
Brownstein’s “religious discrimination” model is unclear but does allow
for both sides to see from the other’s perspective. The government’s
approach would exempt only those whose goods or services are
considered expressive and providing that good or service would require
them to participate in the expressive event.
Assuming that all of these vendors are small business owners, bakers
who create custom wedding cakes should receive an accommodation
under any of these approaches. Wedding photographers would also
receive accommodations as their photography is expressive and requires
them to participate in the event. A florist would also fall into this category.
Whether other vendors such as limousine companies, party supply
companies, and non-religious venues received an accommodation would
depend on which approach is used. These vendors are not typically
considered to provide expressive services. Therefore, they would not
likely receive an accommodation under the government’s approach. They
would also not likely be able to refuse service based on religion, failing
Professor Brownstein’s approach. However, under the religious liberty
professor’s model accommodation, these services would likely be
included.

188.

Id.
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Masterpiece Cakeshop has shown us that to resolve these bitter
disputes there needs to be respect for sincere religious beliefs and the
dignity of same-sex couples. The current case law and the structure and
inflexibility of the courts make it difficult to create judicial
accommodations. It is time for the legislature to step up and resolve these
disputes with religious accommodations designed to protect both the
wedding vendors and the same-sex couples. How the legislature draws
that line will likely rely on its political makeup and which approach to
accommodations it uses, but it is certain that some sort of compromise is
needed.
B.

Judges, Magistrates, and Other Government Officials

Judges, magistrates, and other government officials involved in the
recognition of marriage are another group who face a challenge between
their faith and their role in performing same-sex marriages. 189
County clerks have already been discussed. Kentucky was able to
provide an accommodation for Kim Davis, 190 and North Carolina passed
an accommodation that allowed assistant and deputy register of deeds to
recuse themselves from processing marriage licenses. 191 However, there
are clerks in other states who have not received religious
accommodations. Linda Summers, a deputy clerk from Indiana, was fired
when she refused to process a same-sex marriage license. Her civil rights
lawsuit was dismissed, finding that she was not dismissed for her religious
beliefs but for failing to do her job. 192 There is nothing more needed than
political will to enact meaningful religious accommodations for county
clerks that also protect same-sex couples.
Judges and magistrates have a harder argument to make for religious
accommodations. Several states have issued advisory opinions stating the
requirement of judges to perform same-sex marriages. Three days after
the Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage, the Nebraska Judicial
Ethics Committee issued an advisory opinion stating that a judge who
performs traditional marriages will not be allowed to refuse to perform

189. See also Christopher T. Holinger, Note, When Fundamental Rights Collide, Will We
Tolerate Dissent? Why a Judge Who Declines to Solemnize a Same-Sex Wedding Should Not Be
Punished, 29 REGENT U. L. REV. 365, 365 (2016–2017).
190. See 2016 Ky. Acts 132; supra note 174 and accompanying text.
191. See 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 75.
192. Summers v. Whitis, No. 4:15-cv-00093, 2016 WL 7242483, at *7–8 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 15,
2016).
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same-sex marriages. 193 While performing marriages is an “extrajudicial
activity,” the ethics committee decided that a refusal to perform a samesex wedding even for religious objections would “undermine the judge’s
independence, integrity, and impartiality.” 194 The Supreme Court of Ohio
Board of Professional Conduct issued an advisory opinion stating that
judges may not refuse to perform same-sex marriages but also went a step
farther by stating that any judge who stops performing any marriage to
avoid having to perform same-sex marriages has also manifested bias. 195
The Wisconsin Judicial Conduct Advisory Committee also issued an
advisory opinion stating that a judge who performs any marriages may not
refuse to perform same-sex marriages. 196 While these opinions are
nonbinding, they show the intricacies of providing religious
accommodations for judges.
There have been a few cases of judges facing discipline for refusing
to perform same-sex marriages. One case involved Judge Ruth Neely of
Wyoming who, in response to a reporter’s question regarding her
enthusiasm for performing same-sex marriages, stated that she would not
be able to perform same-sex marriages due to her religious beliefs. She
was never asked to perform a same-sex marriage. 197 The Wyoming
Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, found that promoting the
integrity of the judiciary was a compelling interest 198 and disciplining her
with a public censure is the least restrictive method of upholding judicial
integrity. 199 The dissent viewed the case as one imposing a religious test
on judges. 200 They claim the majority’s compelling interest in protecting
the integrity of the judiciary is overbroad and unfounded on the facts of
the case. 201 The dissent also points to the judicial rules which allow
reassignment of cases to avoid partiality as a less burdensome method of
promoting judicial integrity in this situation. 202

193. Neb. Jud. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 15-1, 2 (2015), https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/
sites/default/files/ethics-opinions/Judicial/15-1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/FNH4-XT23].
194. Id. at 2.
195. See Ohio Bd. Of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 2015-1, 7 (2015),
https://www.ohioadvop.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Op_15-001.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SDE9QAT].
196. Wis. Jud. Conduct Advisory Comm., Formal Op. No. 15-1, 4–5 (2015),
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=146878
[https://perma.cc/W56C-R2YH].
197. Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Jud. Conduct & Ethics, 390 P.3d 728, 734 (Wyo. 2017).
198. Id. at 736.
199. Id. at 753.
200. Id. at 753–54 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 767 (Kautz J., dissenting).
202. Id.
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Another case involved Judge Vance D. Day of Oregon who
instructed his staff to search the local judicial database to determine if the
couples requesting to be married were same-sex. If they were, Judge Day
instructed his staff to politely inform the couple that the judge was
unavailable at the requested time as he was religiously opposed to samesex marriage. 203 The Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability
charged Judge Day with manifesting bias or prejudice in his judicial duties
and failure to perform judicial duties along with eleven other counts for
unrelated incidents. 204 The Oregon Supreme Court held that Judge Day’s
screening process manifested prejudice in the performance of his judicial
duties, 205 but declined to consider Judge Day’s constitutional defense. The
court noted that the findings on the other counts justified the sanction and
the answer to the unsettled constitutional question would not change the
outcome. 206
The third case involved Magistrate Sandra Myrick of North Carolina
who requested a religious accommodation after federal district courts
overruled North Carolina law and required same-sex marriage be treated
the same as opposite-sex marriages. 207 Judicial administrators in North
Carolina distributed memos requiring judges, clerks, and magistrates to
perform same-sex marriages or face discipline. 208 Her supervisors,
believing the directives from judicial administrators left them no ability
to accommodate, accepted Magistrate Myrick’s resignation. 209 She filed a
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The
Administrative Law Judge held that the state discriminated against her
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for not accommodating
her religious belief. 210
While the advisory opinions and disciplinary decisions do not favor
accommodations for judges and magistrates, the North Carolina law that
accommodated assistant and deputy register of deeds also allows
magistrates to recuse themselves from performing all marriages and
provides a willing magistrate should a jurisdiction not have one

203. In re Day, 413 P.3d 907, 921–22 (Or. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 324 (2018).
204. Id. at 922.
205. Id. at 949–53.
206. Id. at 953–54.
207. Myrick v. Warren, No. 16-EEOC-0001, at *5 (Mar. 8, 2017) https://s3.amazonaws.com/
becketnewsite/Myrick-v.-Warren-et.-al.-16-EEOC-0001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TSG6-GL64]
(predating the Supreme Courts recognition of same-sex marriage in Obergefell).
208. Id. at *8.
209. Id. at *9.
210. Id. at *10, 24.
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available. 211 This law, passed after Magistrate Sandra Myrick requested
her accommodation, proves that judges and magistrates can receive
accommodations too.
While judges should be allowed to refuse to perform marriages,
judges should not be able to recuse themselves from all family court
proceedings involving same-sex couples. This is what Judge W. Mitchell
Nance of Kentucky did. 212 As a result, Judge Nance was charged with
judicial misconduct and submitted his resignation. He was found guilty of
misconduct and issued a public reprimand which was the only sanction
available due to his retirement. 213 This conduct does not protect the
dignity of same-sex couples nor the impartiality of the judiciary and
should not be accommodated.
C.

Adoption Agencies

Judge Nance’s case proves that once the disputes around same-sex
weddings are resolved, the next issue will center on the family and begin
with religious adoption agencies. The issue with religious adoption
agencies declining to place children with same-sex couples is that many
of these agencies receive government funding or are reliant on
government contracts to operate as part of the state adoption and foster
programs.
There are cases out of Michigan 214 and Pennsylvania 215 where
religiously-affiliated adoption agencies are at risk of having to close

211. 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 75.
212. Commonwealth of Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Final Order, In re Hon. W. Mitchell Nance, at 3 (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC/Documents/Public_Information/FindingsFactsN
ance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GX3-TLWR].
213. Id. at 5.
214. See Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (denying adoption agency’s
motion to dismiss and allowing same-sex couples to proceed with establishment clause and equal
protection clause claims against the state for using religiously-based adoption agencies who do not
place children with same-sex couples to proceed). Compare, Dumont v. Lyon, BECKET (Sep. 9, 2019),
https://www.becketlaw.org/case/dumont-v-lyon/ [https://perma.cc/S6PC-EHRH] (providing the
religious adoption agency’s position), with Dumont v. Lyon, ACLU (March 22, 2019),
https://www.aclu.org/cases/dumont-v-lyon [https://perma.cc/A244-MDK7] (providing the same-sex
couples’ position).
215. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (denying
religiously-based adoption agency’s motion for injunction after the City of Philadelphia closed the
agency’s intake for the agency’s practice of their religious belief), aff’d, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019),
cert granted, No. 19-123 (Feb. 24, 2020). Compare Sharonell Fulton, et al. v. City of Philadelphia,
BECKET (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.becketlaw.org/case/sharonell-fulton-et-al-v-city-philadelphia/
[https://perma.cc/FLU4-BUKV] (providing the religious adoption agency’s position), with Fulton v.
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because they choose to practice their religious beliefs. Religious
organizations should not be disqualified from assisting the government in
providing services because of their religious beliefs. Such
disqualifications would amount to a religious test for public service. Their
assistance to the government in providing adoption services to their local
communities should not alter whether or not they should be
accommodated for their religious beliefs.
Adoption agencies can be seen like a wedding vendor. Legislatures
can do a similar analysis to determine whether to provide
accommodations. The religious liberty professor’s approach would not
cover adoption agencies as its current form is tailored toward the wedding
scenario. However, it could be tailored to fit same-sex family situations
and provide the same kind of protections for same-sex couples and
religious organizations.
Professor Brownstein directly addresses the issue of refusing to place
children with same-sex couples. He concludes that accommodating
religious adoption agencies would be acceptable. He argues that religious
agencies are often chosen by birth parents to place children in homes of
like faith. This allowable refusal based on religion would permit similar
refusals for same-sex couples provided there are other adoption agencies
able to assist the same-sex couple. 216
Using the government approach, adoption agencies can be viewed as
expressing approval that families are well qualified to care for the children
they are adopting and the adoption process is a very expressive event.
Religious adoption agencies can also be likened to the wedding vendors
that provide a standard “off-the-shelf” product which would remove them
from receiving accommodations. However, the uniqueness and value that
we place on children would make the act of finding the child the best home
available an expressive act and the adoption an expressive event. Under
this approach, religious adoption agencies would receive an
accommodation.
Accommodations for religious adoption agencies that receive
government funds would have Establishment Clause and other statutory
issues to deal with, but those issues are the subject of another article.

City of Philadelphia, ACLU (June 10, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/cases/fulton-v-city-philadelphia
[https://perma.cc/ 632R-HWJH] (providing the same-sex couples’ position).
216. Brownstein, supra note 126, at 426–27.
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VII.CONCLUSION
While Masterpiece Cakeshop did not provide the winner-take-all
legal solution to the issue of same-sex rights versus religious beliefs that
was anticipated, it did provide a formula to resolve the dispute in a way
that worked for both sides. Legislative accommodations are better suited
than judicial accommodations. Several proposals for legislative
accommodations have been made, and several examples of legislative
accommodations have already been enacted. These show that legislative
accommodations that respect both sides have the ability to provide the
best solution to our current and future issues regarding free exercise of
religion and same-sex marriage.
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